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Abstract
The financial crisis showed the importance of measuring, allocating and regulating systemic
risk. Recently, the systemic risk measures that can be decomposed into an aggregation function
and a scalar measure of risk, received a lot of attention. In this framework, capital allocations are
added after aggregation and can represent bailout costs. More recently, a framework has been
introduced, where institutions are supplied with capital allocations before aggregation. This
yields an interpretation that is particularly useful for regulatory purposes. In each framework,
the set of all feasible capital allocations leads to a multivariate risk measure. In this paper, we
present dual representations for scalar systemic risk measures as well as for the corresponding
multivariate risk measures concerning capital allocations. Our results cover both frameworks:
aggregating after allocating and allocating after aggregation. As examples, we consider the
aggregation mechanisms of the Eisenberg-Noe model as well as those of the resource allocation
and network flow models. Finally, we illustrate how the dual representations developed here can
be useful for computational purposes.
Keywords and phrases: systemic risk, risk measure, financial network, dual representation,
convex duality, penalty function, relative entropy, multivariate risk, shortfall risk
Mathematics Subject Classification (2010): 91B30, 46N10, 46A20, 26E25, 90C46.
1 Introduction
Systemic risk can be regarded as the inability of an interconnected system to function properly. In
the financial mathematics community, defining, measuring and allocating systemic risk has been
of increasing interest especially after the recent financial crisis. This paper is concerned with the
representations and economic interpretations of some recently proposed measures of systemic risk
from a convex duality point of view.
Canonically, network models are used for the analysis of systemic risk as proposed by the
pioneering work of Eisenberg, Noe (2001). In this model, the institutions of an interconnected
financial system are represented by the nodes of a network and the liabilities of these institutions
to each other are represented on the arcs. Under mild nondegeneracy conditions, it is proved
in Eisenberg, Noe (2001) that the system can reach an equilibrium by realizing a unique clearing
payment mechanism computed as the solution of a fixed point problem. The Eisenberg-Noe model is
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generalized in various directions since then, for instance, by taking into account illiquidity (Cifuentes
et al., 2005), randomness in liabilities (Chen et al., 2013), central clearing (Amini et al., 2015), to
name a few.
More recently, several authors have considered the question of measuring systemic risk in relation
to the classical framework of monetary risk measures in Artzner et al. (1999). The following three-
step structure can be seen as a blueprint for the systemic risk measures defined in the recent
literature (Amini et al., 2015; Armenti et al., 2015; Biagini et al., 2017; Brunnermeier, Cheridito,
2014; Chen et al., 2013; Feinstein et al., 2017; Kromer et al., 2016).
• Aggregation function: The aggregation function quantifies the impact that the random
shocks of the system have on society by taking into account the interconnectedness of the
institutions. It is a multivariate function that takes as input the random wealths (shocks) of
the individual institutions and gives as output a scalar quantity that represents the impact of
the financial system on society or on real economy. In the Eisenberg-Noe model, for instance,
one can simply add society to the financial network as an additional node and define the value
of the aggregation function as the net equity of society after clearing payments are realized.
More simplistic choices of the aggregation function can consider total equities and losses, only
total losses, or certain utility functions of these quantities; see Chen et al. (2013); Kromer
et al. (2016).
• Acceptance set: As the wealths of the institutions are typically subject to randomness, the
aggregation function outputs a random quantity accordingly. The next step is to test these
random values with respect to a criterion for riskiness, which is formalized by the notion
of the acceptance set A of a monetary risk measure ρ. For instance, one can consider the
acceptance set of the (conditional) value-at-risk at a probability level and check if the random
total loss of the system is an element of this acceptance set.
• Systemic risk measure: The last step is to define the systemic risk measure based on the
choices of the aggregation function Λ and the acceptance set A. Chen et al. (2013) proposed
the first axiomatic study for measuring systemic risk based on monetary risk measures, where
the systemic risk measure is defined as
ρins(X) = ρ(Λ(X)) = inf {k ∈ R | Λ(X) + k ∈ A} , (1.1)
where the argument X is a d-dimensional random vector denoting the wealths of the institu-
tions. In a financial network model, the value of this systemic risk measure can be interpreted
as the minimum total endowment needed in order to make the equity of society acceptable.
If one is interested in the individual contributions of the institutions to systemic risk, ρins(X)
needs to be allocated back to these institutions. To be able to consider the measurement and
allocation of systemic risk at the same time, the values of systemic risk measures are defined
in Feinstein et al. (2017) as sets of vectors of individual capital allocations for the institutions.
Hence, the systemic risk measures in Feinstein et al. (2017) map into the power set of Rd,
that is, they are set-valued functionals. For instance, the set-valued counterpart of ρins(X) is
defined as
Rins(X) =
{
z ∈ Rd | Λ(X) +
d∑
i=1
zi ∈ A
}
.
The risk measures ρins and Rins are considered insensitive as they do not take into account
the effect of the additional endowments in the aggregation procedure. Thus, they can be
interpreted as bailout costs: the costs of making a system acceptable after the random shock
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X of the system has impacted society. In contrast to this, a sensitive version is proposed in
Feinstein et al. (2017) (and in Biagini et al. (2017) as scalar functionals) where the aggregation
function inputs the augmented wealths of the institutions:
Rsen(X) =
{
z ∈ Rd | Λ(X + z) ∈ A
}
.
In analogy to (1.1) one can consider the smallest overall addition of capital
ρsen(X) = inf
{
d∑
i=1
zi | Λ(X + z) ∈ A
}
, (1.2)
that makes the impact of X on society acceptable. But in contrast to the insensitive case,
the sensitive risk measures Rsen and ρsen can be used for regulation: by enforcing to add
the capital vector z ∈ Rd to the wealth of the banks as the impact on society after capital
regulation, that is Λ(X + z), is made acceptable. They are called sensitive as they take the
impact of capital regulations on the system into account.
This paper provides dual representation results for the systemic risk measures Rins and Rsen as
well as for their scalarizations ρins and ρsen in terms of three types of dual variables: probability
measures for each of the financial institutions, weights for each of the financial institutions, and
probability measures for society. The probability measures can be interpreted as possible models
governing the dynamics of the institutions/society. Each time one makes a guess for these models, a
penalty is incurred according to “how far” these measures are from the true probability measure of
the financial system. Then, the so-called systemic penalty function (Definition 3.1) is computed as
the minimized value of this penalty over all choices of the probability measure of society. According
to the dual representations, the systemic risk measures Rins and Rsen collect the capital allocation
vectors whose certain weighted sums pass a threshold level determined by the systemic penalty
function.
In terms of economic interpretations, a convenient feature of the dual representations is that
(the objective function of) the systemic penalty function has an additive structure in which the
contributions of the network topology (encoded in conjugate function of Λ) and the choice of the
regulatory criterion for riskiness (encoded in the penalty function of ρ) are transparent. Moreover,
the first term dealing with the network topology can be regarded as a multivariate divergence
functional, for instance, a multivariate relative entropy, and it can be written in a simple analytical
form in many interesting cases where the aggregation function Λ itself, as the primal object, is
defined in terms of an optimization problem. For instance, this is the case for the Eisenberg-Noe
model without (Section 4.4) and with (Section 4.5) central clearing, as well as for the classical
resource allocation and network flow models of operations research.
In addition to their economic interpretations, the dual representations of the present paper
may be useful for the computation of systemic risk measures. While the actual computational
experiments are beyond our scope, we discuss this link in Section 5.
In the general (non-systemic) setting, dual representations for risk measures are well-studied;
see Fo¨llmer, Schied (2011) for the univariate case and Hamel, Heyde (2010) for the multivariate
(set-valued) case. It should be noted that the dual representations of the present paper do not
follow as consequences of the dual representations of the general framework. This is because both
the insensitive and the sensitive systemic risk measures are defined in terms of the composition of
the univariate risk measure ρ and the aggregation function Λ. In contrast to the existing duality
results for general risk measures, the results of the paper “dualize” both ρ and Λ. In the special case
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where Λ is a linear function, this can be achieved by the well-known Fenchel-Rockafellar theorem.
On the other hand, the general case where Λ is a concave function is less well-known. It turns out
that Zalinescu (2002, Theorem 2.8.10) dealing with the general case does not apply in our setting.
Instead, we use a generalized version of this theorem, Bot¸ et al. (2009, Theorem 3.1), which has
weaker continuity assumptions.
To the best of our knowledge, dual representations of systemic risk measures in the sensitive
case (Rsen and ρsen) have not yet been studied in the literature. In the more traditional insensitive
setting, Chen et al. (2013, Theorem 3) provides a dual representation for ρins assuming that the
underlying probability space is finite and Λ, ρ are positively homogeneous functions. Under these
assumptions, ρins can be computed as the optimal value of a finite-dimensional linear optimization
problem and the corresponding dual problem is regarded as a dual reprensentation for ρins. This
result is generalized by Kromer et al. (2016) for general probability spaces, convex ρ and concave
Λ. It should be noted that the dual representation for ρins given in the present paper provides
a different economic interpretation than the ones in Chen et al. (2013); Kromer et al. (2016). In
particular, Chen et al. (2013, Theorem 3) is stated in terms of sub-probability measures (sub-
stochastic vectors) and the “remaining” mass to extend such a measure to a probability measure is
interpreted as a probability assigned to an artificial scenario ω0 added to the underlying probability
space. In contrast, Theorem 3.2 and Corollary 3.4 of the present paper are stated in terms of
probability measures corresponding to the institutions as well as an additional probability measure
corresponding to society. Note that society is considered as an additional node in the network of
institutions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the definitions of the systemic risk
measures are recalled along with some basic properties. In Section 3, the main results of the paper
are collected in Theorem 3.2 followed by some comments on the economic interpretation of these
results. The form of the dual representations under some canonical aggregation functions, including
that of the Eisenberg-Noe model, are investigated in Section 4. A model uncertainty representation
of the sensitive systemic risk measure is discussed in Section 6. Finally, Section 7, the Appendix,
is devoted to proofs.
2 Insensitive and sensitive systemic risk measures
We consider an interconnected financial system with d institutions. By a realized state of the system,
we mean a vector x = (x1, . . . , xd)
T ∈ Rd, where xi denotes the wealth of institution i. To compare
two possible states x, z ∈ Rd, we use the componentwise ordering ≤ on Rd; hence, x ≤ z if and
only if xi ≤ zi for every i ∈ {1, . . . , d}. We write Rd+ =
{
x ∈ Rd | 0 ≤ x}.
Given a realized state, the interconnectedness of the system is taken into account through a
single quantity provided by the so-called aggregation function. Formally speaking, this is a function
Λ: Rd → R satisfying the following properties.
(i) Increasing: x ≤ z implies Λ(x) ≤ Λ(z) for every x, z ∈ Rd.
(ii) Concave: It holds Λ(γx+ (1−γ)z) ≥ γΛ(x) + (1−γ)Λ(z) for every x, z ∈ Rd and γ ∈ [0, 1].
(iii) Non-constant: Λ has at least two distinct values.
As discussed in Section 1, Λ(x) can be interpreted as the impact of the system on society given that
the state of the system is x ∈ Rd. An overall increase in the wealth of the system is anticipated to
have a positive impact on society, which is reflected by the property that Λ is increasing. Similarly,
the concavity of Λ reflects that diversification in wealth has a positive impact on society. In
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particular, when Λ is differentiable, its derivative Λ′ can be regarded as a marginal impact function,
which is decreasing under the concavity assumption. Finally, the last condition eliminates the trivial
case that Λ is a constant, which ensures that the set Λ(Rd) :=
{
Λ(x) | x ∈ Rd} has an interior point.
To model the effect of a financial crisis, a catastrophic event, or any sort of uncertainty affecting
the system, we assume that the state of the system is indeed a random vector X on a probability
space (Ω,F ,P). Hence, the impact on society is realized to be Λ(X(ω)) if the observed scenario
for the uncertainty is ω ∈ Ω. For convenience, we assume that X ∈ L∞d , where L∞d is the space of
d-dimensional essentially bounded random vectors that are distinguished up to almost sure equality.
Consequently, the impact on society is a univariate random variable Λ(X) ∈ L∞, where L∞ = L∞1 .
Throughout, we call Λ(X) the aggregate value of the system.
The systemic risk measures we consider are defined in terms of a measure of risk for the aggregate
values. To that end, we let ρ : L∞ → R be a convex monetary risk measure in the sense of Artzner
et al. (1999). More precisely, ρ satisfies the following properties. (Throughout, (in)equalities
between random variables are understood in the P-almost sure sense.)
(i) Monotonicity: Y1 ≥ Y2 implies ρ(Y1) ≤ ρ(Y2) for every Y1, Y2 ∈ L∞.
(ii) Translativity: It holds ρ(Y + y) = ρ(Y )− y for every Y ∈ L∞ and y ∈ R.
(iii) Convexity: It holds ρ(γY1 + (1− γ)Y2) ≤ γρ(Y1) + (1− γ)ρ(Y2) for every Y1, Y2 ∈ L∞ and
γ ∈ [0, 1].
(iv) Fatou property: If (Yn)n≥1 is a bounded sequence in L∞ converging to some Y ∈ L∞
almost surely, then ρ(Y ) ≤ lim infn→∞ ρ(Yn).
The risk measure ρ is characterized by its so-called acceptance set A ⊆ L∞ via the following
relationships
A = {Y ∈ L∞ | ρ(Y ) ≤ 0} , ρ(Y ) = inf {y ∈ R | Y + y ∈ A} .
Hence, the aggregate value Λ(X) is considered acceptable if Λ(X) ∈ A.
As a well-definedness assumption for the systemic risk measures of interest, we will need the
following, where int Λ(Rd) denotes the interior of the set Λ(Rd).
Assumption 2.1. ρ(0) ∈ int Λ(Rd).
Remark 2.2. Note that Assumption 2.1 can be replaced with the weaker assumption that int Λ(Rd)
is a nonempty set, which is already satisfied thanks to the assumption that Λ is a non-constant
function. In that case, by shifting Λ by a constant, one can easily obtain an aggregation function
that satisfies Assumption 2.1.
Finally, we recall the definitions of the two systemic risk measures of our interest. As in Armenti
et al. (2015); Feinstein et al. (2017), we adopt the so-called set-valued approach, namely, systemic
risk is measured as the set of all capital allocation vectors that make the system safe in the sense
that the aggregate value becomes acceptable when the institutions are supplied with these capital
allocations. We consider first the insensitive case, where institutions are supplied with capital
allocations after aggregation, and then consider the sensitive case, where institutions are supplied
with capital allocations before aggregation.
We start by recalling the set-valued analog of the systemic risk measure in Chen et al. (2013).
In what follows, 2R
d
denotes the power set of Rd including the empty set.
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Definition 2.3. (Feinstein et al., 2017, Example 2.1.(i)) The insensitive systemic risk measure is
the set-valued function Rins : L∞d → 2R
d
defined by
Rins(X) =
{
z ∈ Rd | Λ(X) +
d∑
i=1
zi ∈ A
}
for every X ∈ L∞d .
Remark 2.4. Note that
Rins(X) =
{
z ∈ Rd | ρ
(
Λ(X) +
d∑
i=1
zi
)
≤ 0
}
=
{
z ∈ Rd | ρins(X) ≤
d∑
i=1
zi
}
, (2.1)
where ρins = ρ ◦ Λ is the scalar systemic risk measure in Chen et al. (2013), see (1.1). It follows
from (2.1) that
ρins(X) = inf
z∈Rins(X)
d∑
i=1
zi.
Hence, ρins(X) and Rins(X) determine each other.
As motivated in Section 1, a more “sensitive” systemic risk measure can be defined by aggre-
gating the wealths after the institutions are supplied with their capital allocations.
Definition 2.5. (Feinstein et al., 2017, Example 2.1.(ii)) The sensitive systemic risk measure is
the set-valued function Rsen : L∞d → 2R
d
defined by
Rsen(X) =
{
z ∈ Rd | Λ(X + z) ∈ A
}
for every X ∈ L∞d .
Remark 2.6. For fixed X ∈ L∞d , note that
Rsen(X) =
{
z ∈ Rd | ρ(Λ(X + z)) ≤ 0
}
=
{
z ∈ Rd | ρins(X + z) ≤ 0
}
. (2.2)
However, Rsen(X) cannot be recovered from ρins(X), in general.
Let us denote by L1d the set of all d-dimensional random vectors X whose expectations E [X] :=
(E [X1] , . . . ,E [Xd])T exist as points in Rd.
Definition 2.7. (Hamel, Heyde, 2010, Definition 2.1) For a set-valued function R : L∞d → 2R
d
,
consider the following properties.
(i) Monotonicity: X ≥ Z implies R(X) ⊇ R(Z) for every X,Z ∈ L∞d .
(ii) Convexity: It holds R(γX + (1 − γ)Z) ⊇ γR(X) + (1 − γ)R(Z) for every X,Z ∈ L∞d and
γ ∈ [0, 1].
(iii) Closedness: The set {X ∈ L∞d | z ∈ R(X)} is closed with respect to the weak∗ topology
σ(L∞d , L
1
d) for every z ∈ Rd.
(iv) Finiteness at zero: It holds R(0) /∈ {∅,Rd}.
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(v) Translativity: It holds R(X + z) = R(X)− z for every X ∈ L∞d and z ∈ Rd.
(vi) Positive homogeneity: It holds R(γX) = γR(X) := {γz | z ∈ R(X)} for every X ∈ L∞d
and γ > 0.
Proposition 2.8.
1. Rins is a set-valued convex risk measure that is non-translative in general: it satisfies proper-
ties (i)-(iv) above.
2. Rsen is a set-valued convex risk measure: it satisfies all of properties (i)-(v) above.
The proof of Proposition 2.8 is given in Section 7.1.
Remark 2.9. Let X ∈ L∞d . An immediate consequence of Proposition 2.8 is that Rsen(X) is a
closed convex subset of Rd satisfying Rsen(X) = Rsen(X) + Rd+. Hence, we may write Rsen(X) as
the intersection of its supporting halfspaces
Rsen(X) =
⋂
w∈Rd+\{0}
{
z ∈ Rd | wTz ≥ ρsenw (X)
}
,
where
ρsenw (X) := inf
z∈Rsen(X)
wTz = inf
z∈Rd
{
wTz | Λ(X + z) ∈ A
}
,
for each w ∈ Rd+\{0}. In other words, ρsenw is the scalarization of the set-valued function Rsen in
direction w ∈ Rd+\{0} and is a scalar measure of systemic risk, see Feinstein et al. (2017, Defini-
tion 3.3). The family (ρsenw (X))w∈Rd+\{0} determines R
sen(X); compare Remark 2.4 and Remark 2.6.
If one chooses w = (1, . . . , 1)T ∈ Rd one obtains the risk measure given in (1.2).
We conclude this section with sufficient conditions that guarantee the positive homogeneity of
the systemic risk measures; see (vi) of Definition 2.7.
Proposition 2.10. Suppose that Λ and ρ are positively homogeneous, that is, Λ(γx) = γΛ(x) and
ρ(γX) = γρ(X) for every x ∈ Rd, X ∈ L∞d , λ > 0. Then, Rins and Rsen are positively homogeneous.
The proof of Proposition 2.10 is given in Section 7.1.
3 Dual representations
The main results of this paper provide dual representations for the insensitive (Rins) and sensitive
(Rsen) systemic risk measures and their scalarizations ρins and ρsen.
The dual representations are formulated in terms of probability measures and (weight) vectors
in Rd. To begin with, let us denote byM(P) the set of all probability measures on (Ω,F) that are
absolutely continuous with respect to P, and byMe(P) its subset whose elements are also equivalent
to P. In addition, we denote byMd(P) the set of all vector probability measures Q = (Q1, . . . ,Qd)T
whose components are in M(P). Let 1 be the vector in Rd whose components are all equal to 1.
Let us denote by g the Legendre-Fenchel conjugate of the convex function x 7→ −Λ(−x), that
is,
g(z) = sup
x∈Rd
(
Λ(x)− zTx
)
(3.1)
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for z ∈ Rd. A direct consequence of the monotonicity of Λ is that g(z) = +∞ for every z /∈ Rd+,
hence we will only consider the values of g for z ∈ Rd+.
In addition, since ρ : L∞ → R is a convex monetary risk measure satisfying the Fatou property,
it has the dual representation
ρ(Y ) = sup
S∈M(P)
(
ES [−Y ]− α(S)
)
for every Y ∈ L∞, where α is the (minimal) penalty function of ρ defined by
α(S) := sup
Y ∈A
ES [−Y ] = sup
Y ∈L∞
(
ES [−Y ]− ρ(Y )
)
(3.2)
for S ∈M(P); see Fo¨llmer, Schied (2011, Theorem 4.33), for instance.
For two vectors x, z ∈ Rd, their Hadamard product is defined by
x · z := (x1z1, . . . , xdzd)T .
Definition 3.1. The function αsys : Md(P)×
(
Rd+\{0}
)→ R ∪ {+∞} defined by
αsys(Q, w) := inf
S∈Me(P)
(
α(S) + ES
[
g
(
w · dQ
dS
)])
for Q ∈Md(P), w ∈ Rd+\{0} is called the systemic penalty function.
Note that g(z) ≥ Λ(0) for every z ∈ Rd, by (3.1). Hence, g is bounded from below since Λ is a
real-valued function. This makes the quantity ES
[
g
(
w · dQdS
)]
in Definition 3.1 well-defined.
The following theorem summarizes the main results of the paper. Its proof is given in Section 7.2,
the appendix.
Theorem 3.2. The insensitive and sensitive systemic risk measures admit the following dual rep-
resentations.
1. For every X ∈ L∞d ,
Rins(X) =
⋂
Q∈Md(P),w∈Rd+\{0}
{
z ∈ Rd | 1Tz ≥ wTEQ [−X]− αsys(Q, w)
}
=
{
z ∈ Rd | 1Tz ≥ sup
Q∈Md(P),w∈Rd+\{0}
(
wTEQ [−X]− αsys(Q, w)
)}
.
2. For every X ∈ L∞d ,
Rsen(X) =
⋂
Q∈Md(P),w∈Rd+\{0}
{
z ∈ Rd | wTz ≥ wTEQ [−X]− αsys(Q, w)
}
=
⋂
Q∈Md(P),w∈Rd+\{0}
(
EQ [−X] +
{
z ∈ Rd | wTz ≥ −αsys(Q, w)
})
.
Let us comment on the economic interpretation of the above dual representations. Consider a
financial network with nodes 1, . . . , d denoting the institutions and society is added to this network
as node 0. The dual representations can be regarded as the conservative computations of the capital
allocations of the institutions in the presence of model uncertainty and weight ambiguity according
to the following procedure.
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• Society is assigned a probability measure S, which has the associated penalty α(S).
• Each institution i is assigned a probability measure Qi and a relative weight wi with respect
to society.
• The distance of the network of institutions to society is computed by the multivariate g-
divergence of (Q1, . . . ,Qd) with respect to S as follows. Each density dQidS is multiplied by
its associated relative weight wi, and the weighted densities are used as the input of the
divergence function g. The resulting multivariate g-divergence is
ES
[
g
(
w1
dQ1
dS
, . . . , wd
dQd
dS
)]
,
which can be seen as a weighted sum distance of the vector probability measure Q to the
probability measure S of society. In particular, when the aggregation function Λ is in a
certain exponential form (Section 4.3 below), the multivariate g-divergence is a weighted sum
of relative entropies with respect to S.
• The systemic penalty function αsys is computed as the minimized sum of the multivariate
g-divergence and the penalty function α over all possible choices of the probability measure
S of society in Me(P), see (3.1). This is the total penalty incurred for choosing Q and w as
a probabilistic model of the financial system.
• Insensitive case: To compute Rins(X), one computes the worst case weighted negative
expectation of the wealth vector X penalized by the systemic penalty function over all possible
choices of the uncertain model Q ∈Md(P) and the ambigious weight vector w ∈ Rd+\{0}:
ρins(X) = sup
Q∈Md(P),w∈Rd+\{0}
(
wTEQ [−X]− αsys(Q, w)
)
.
This quantity serves as the minimal total endowment needed for the network of institutions:
every capital allocation vector z ∈ Rd whose sum of entries exceeds ρins(X) is considered
as a feasible compensator of systemic risk, and hence, it is included in the set Rins(X). In
particular, Rins(X) is a halfspace with direction vector 1.
• Sensitive case: To compute Rsen(X), one computes the negative expectation of the wealth
vector X penalized by the systemic penalty function. This quantity serves as a threshold
for the weighted total endowment of the institutions: a capital allocation vector z ∈ Rd is
considered feasible with respect to the model Q ∈ Md(P) and weight vector w ∈ Rd+\{0} if
its weighted sum exceeds its corresponding threshold, that is, if
wTz ≥ wTEQ [−X]− αsys(Q, w).
Finally, a capital allocation vector z ∈ Rd is considered as a feasible compensator of systemic
risk if it is feasible with respect to all possible choices of the model Q and weight vector w.
Remark 3.3. Let us consider the special case where the risk measure ρ for the aggregate values
is ρ(Y ) = E [−Y ] for every Y ∈ L∞. In this case, we have α(S) = 0 if and only if S = P, and
α(S) = +∞ otherwise. In view of the above economic interpretations, this choice of ρ corresponds
precisely to the case where there is no uncertainty about the probability measure of society. In
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particular, the systemic penalty function reduces simply to the multivariate g-divergence with
respect to the true probability measure P, that is,
αsys(Q, w) = E
[
g
(
w · dQ
dP
)]
for every Q ∈ Md(P) and w ∈ Rd+ \{0}. Nevertheless, the model uncertainty (as well as the
weight ambiguity) associated to the banks remains in the picture since one has still to calculate
the intersections over different choices of (Q, w) in Theorem 3.2. This observation can be seen as a
justification of the interpretation that the aggregation function Λ is a society-related quantity: as
ρ is used to test whether Λ(X) is acceptable, a simplistic risk-neutral choice of ρ eliminates only
the part of model uncertainty coming from society.
As a corollary to Theorem 3.2, we state below the dual representations of the so-called scalar-
izations of the insensitive and sensitive systemic risk measures. Recall from Remark 2.4 that
ρins(X) = inf
z∈Rins(X)
1Tz
for every X ∈ L∞d , where ρins = ρ ◦ Λ. Hence, ρins is the scalarization of the set-valued function
Rins in the direction 1. From (2.1), it is clear that the values of Rins are halfspaces with normal
direction 1. Hence, the scalarizations of Rins in different directions yield trivial values, that is, for
every X ∈ L∞d ,
inf
z∈Rins(X)
wTz = −∞
provided that w ∈ Rd+\{0} is not of the form w = λ1 for some λ > 0. On the other hand, this is
not the case for Rsen as its values are not halfspaces in general.
Recall from Remark 2.9 the scalarizations
ρsenw (X) = inf
z∈Rsen(X)
wTz = inf
z∈Rd
{
wTz | Λ(X + z) ∈ A
}
,
for X ∈ L∞d and w ∈ Rd+\{0}. One such scalarization can be used as a scalar measure of systemic risk
if one can fix a priori a weight vector w ∈ Rd+\{0} which implies a ranking of the importance of the
institutions. While ρsenw is a monotone convex functional, it has the following form of translativity
that depends on the choice of w: for every X ∈ L∞d , z ∈ Rd,
ρsenw (X + z) = ρ
sen
w (X)− wTz.
Corollary 3.4. The scalarizations of the insensitive and sensitive systemic risk measures admit
the following dual representations.
1. For every X ∈ L∞d ,
ρins(X) = sup
Q∈Md(P),w∈Rd+\{0}
(
wTEQ [−X]− αsys(Q, w)
)
.
2. For every w ∈ Rd+\{0}, X ∈ L∞d ,
ρsenw (X) = sup
Q∈Md(P)
(
wTEQ [−X]− α˜sys(Q, w)
)
,
where α˜sys(Q, ·) is the positively homogeneous function generated by αsys(Q, ·) (see Rockafellar
(1970, Chapter 5)), namely,
α˜sys(Q, w) := inf
λ>0
αsys(Q, λw)
λ
. (3.3)
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Consequently, ρins and ρsen1 do not coincide, in general.
The proof of Corollary 3.4 is given in Section 7.2.
The second part of Corollary 3.4 gives rise to an alternative dual representation for Rsen which
we note next.
Corollary 3.5. For every X ∈ L∞d ,
Rsen(X) =
⋂
Q∈Md(P),w∈Rd+\{0}
{
z ∈ Rd | wTz ≥ wTEQ [−X]− α˜sys(Q, w)
}
,
where a˜sys is defined as in (3.3).
Proof. The result is an immediate consequence of Corollary 3.4 and Remark 2.9.
Remark 3.6. Corollary 3.5 can be used to justify the interpretation of the dual variable w ∈ Rd+
as a vector of relative weights. It can be assumed that the absolute weight of society is w0 = 1
and the weights w1, . . . , wd of the institutions are relative to this value of w0. In an alternative
formulation, one can work with absolute weights w¯0 > 0, w¯ ∈ Rd+\{0} for both the institutions and
society. Then, it follows from (3.3) that
α˜sys(Q, w¯) = inf
S∈Me(P),w¯0>0
(
α¯
(
w¯0
dS
dP
)
+ w¯0ES
[
g
(
w¯
w¯0
· dQ
dS
)])
, (3.4)
where α¯
(
w¯0
dS
dP
)
:= supY ∈A w¯0ES[−Y ] extends the definition of α in (3.2) for the finite measure
w¯0S. In this formulation, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, the fraction w¯iw¯0 is the relative weight of institution
i with respect to society. Theorem 3.2 suggests that the sensitive systemic risk measure Rsen is
scale-free in the sense that only relative weights matter for the calculation of Rsen. Hence, it is
enough to consider the case w¯0 = w0 = 1 and write down the dual representation in terms of the
relative weight vector w¯w¯0 = w.
These observations are also in line with the fact that the systemic penalty function αsys is not
positively homogeneous in the relative weight variable, in general: αsys(Q, λw) and λαsys(Q, λw)
do not coincide, in general (λ > 0). On the other hand, the expression in the infimum in (3.4) is
positively homogeneous as a function of the absolute weight vector (w¯0, w¯1, . . . , w¯d) ∈ Rd+1.
In Section 5, we illustrate how the positively homogeneous function α˜sys in (3.3) can be used
for the computation of the sensitive systemic risk measure Rsen.
We end this section with the dual representation of the systemic risk measures when they are
guaranteed to be positively homogeneous by virtue of Proposition 2.10.
Corollary 3.7. Suppose that Λ and ρ are positively homogeneous. Then, there exists a nonempty
closed convex set Z ⊆ Rd+ such that
g(z) =
{
0 if z ∈ Z,
+∞ else.
Besides, there exists a convex set S ⊆M(P) of probability measures such that
α(S) =
{
0 if S ∈ S,
+∞ else.
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Let
D :=
{
(Q, w) ∈Md(P)× Rd+\{0} | P
{
w · dQ
dS
∈ Z
}
= 1 for some S ∈Me(P) ∩ S
}
.
Then, the insensitive and sensitive systemic risk measures admit the following dual representations.
1. For every X ∈ L∞d ,
Rins(X) =
⋂
(Q,w)∈D
{
z ∈ Rd | 1Tz ≥ wTEQ [−X]
}
and
ρins(X) = sup
(Q,w)∈D
wTEQ [−X] .
2. For every X ∈ L∞d ,
Rsen(X) =
⋂
(Q,w)∈D
{
z ∈ Rd | wTz ≥ wTEQ [−X]
}
=
⋂
(Q,w)∈D
(
EQ [−X] +
{
z ∈ Rd | wTz ≥ 0
})
and
ρsenw (X) = sup
Q∈Qw
wTEQ [−X] ,
where
Qw := {Q ∈Md(P) | (Q, λw) ∈ D for some λ > 0} .
Proof. The existence of the set Z is due to the following well-known facts from convex analysis;
see Rockafellar (1970, Theorem 13.2), for instance: a positively homogeneous proper closed convex
function is the support function of a nonempty closed convex set, and the conjugate of this function
is the convex indicator function of the set. The existence of the set S is by the dual representations
of coherent risk measures; see Fo¨llmer, Schied (2011, Corollary 4.37). From Definition 3.1, it
follows that αsys(Q, w) = 0 if (Q, w) ∈ D and αsys(Q, w) = +∞ otherwise. In particular, for fixed
w ∈ Rd+ \{0}, a simple calculation yields that α˜sys(Q, w) = 0 if Q ∈ Qw and α˜sys(Q, w) = +∞
otherwise, where α˜sys is defined as in Corollary 3.4. The rest follows from Theorem 3.2.
4 Examples
According to Theorem 3.2, to be able to specify the dual representation of the insensitive and
sensitive systemic risk measures, one needs to compute the penalty function α of the underlying
monetary risk measure ρ as well as the multivariate g-divergence ES[g(w · dQdS )] for dual probability
measures S,Q and weight vector w. As the penalty functions of some canonical risk measures
(for instance, average value-at-risk, entropic risk measure, optimized certainty equivalents) are
quite well known, we focus on the computation of multivariate g-divergences here. In the following
subsections, we consider some canonical examples of aggregation functions proposed in the systemic
risk literature.
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4.1 Total profit-loss model
One of the simplest ways to quantify the impact of the system on society is to aggregate all profits
and losses in the system (Chen et al., 2013, Example 1). This amounts to setting
Λ(x) =
d∑
i=1
xi.
for every realized state x ∈ Rd. In this case, it is clear from Definition 2.3 and Definition 2.5 that
Rins = Rsen.
An elementary calculation using (3.1) yields
g(z) =
{
0 if z = 1,
+∞ else,
for every z ∈ Rd. Hence, given dual variables Q ∈Md(P), S ∈Me(P), w ∈ Rd+\{0}, we have
ES
[
g
(
w · dQ
dS
)]
=
{
0 if w = 1,Qi = S for every i ∈ {1, . . . , d} ,
+∞ else.
As a result, once a measure S is chosen for society, the only plausible choice of the measure Qi of
institution i is S, and any other choice would yield infinite g-divergence. Therefore,
αsys(Q, w) =
{
α(S) if w = 1,Q1 = . . . = Qd = S for some S ∈Me(P),
+∞ else,
and one obtains
Rins(X) = Rsen(X) =
{
z ∈ Rd | 1Tz ≥ − inf
S∈Me(P)
(
d∑
i=1
ES [Xi] + α(S)
)}
for every X ∈ L∞d .
4.2 Total loss model
The previous example of aggregation function can be modified so as to take into account only the
losses in the system (Chen et al., 2013, Example 2), that is, we can define
Λ(x) = −
d∑
i=1
x−i
for every x ∈ Rd. In this case, the insensitive and sensitive systemic risk measures no longer
coincide.
The conjugate function for the total loss model is given by
g(z) =
{
0 if zi ∈ [0, 1] for every i ∈ {1, . . . , d} ,
+∞ else,
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for every z ∈ Rd. Hence, given Q ∈Md(P), S ∈Me(P), w ∈ Rd+\{0},
ES
[
g
(
w · dQ
dS
)]
=
{
0 if wi
dQi
dS ∈ [0, 1] for every i ∈ {1, . . . , d} ,
+∞ else.
Therefore, the systemic penalty function can be given as
αsys(Q, w) = inf
{
α(S) | S ∈Me(P) with widQi
dS
≤ 1 for every i ∈ {1, . . . , d}
}
.
4.3 Entropic model
As an example of a strictly concave aggregation function, let us suppose that Λ aggregates the
profits and losses through an exponential utility function (Feinstein et al., 2017, Section 5.1(iii)),
namely,
Λ(x) = −
d∑
i=1
e−xi−1
for every x ∈ Rd. Then, for every z ∈ Rd+,
g(z) =
d∑
i=1
zi log(zi),
where log(0) := −∞ and 0 log(0) := 0 by convention. Hence, for every Q ∈ Md(P), S ∈ Me(P),
w ∈ Rd+\{0}, the g-divergence is given by
ES
[
g
(
w · dQ
dS
)]
=
d∑
i=1
H (wiQi‖S) ,
where H (wiQi‖S) is the relative entropy of the finite measure wiQi with respect to society’s prob-
ability measure S, that is,
H (wiQi‖S) := ES
[
wi
dQi
dS
log
(
wi
dQi
dS
)]
.
Since H(wiQi‖S) = wiH(Qi‖S) + wi log(wi), one can also write
ES
[
g
(
w · dQ
dS
)]
=
d∑
i=1
wiH (Qi‖S) +
d∑
i=1
wi log(wi).
Hence, the systemic penalty function has the form
αsys(Q, w) = inf
S∈Me(P)
(
α(S) +
d∑
i=1
H (wiQi‖S)
)
= inf
S∈Me(P)
(
α(S) +
d∑
i=1
wiH (Qi‖S)
)
+ c(w),
where c(w) :=
∑d
i=1wi log(wi).
Finally, we consider a special case where the underlying monetary risk measure ρ is the entropic
risk measure, that is,
ρ(Y ) = logE
[
e−Y
]
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for every Y ∈ L∞. In this case, the penalty function of ρ is also a relative entropy:
α(S) = H (S‖P) .
As a result, the systemic penalty function becomes
αsys(Q, w) = inf
S∈Me(P)
(
H (S‖P) +
d∑
i=1
wiH (Qi‖S)
)
+ c(w).
As relative entropy is a commonly used quantification of distance between probability measures, this
form of the systemic penalty function provides a geometric insight to the economic interpretations
discussed in Section 3. Indeed, the sum H (S‖P) +∑di=1wiH (Qi‖S) can be seen as the weighted
sum distance of the vector probability measure Q to the physical measure P while passing through
the probability measure S of society: as a first step, one measures the distance from each Qi to
S as H (Qi‖S), and computes their weighted sum
∑d
i=1wiH (Qi‖S). Then, this weighted sum is
added to the distance H (S‖P) of S to P, which gives the total distance of Q to P via S. Finally,
the systemic penalty function looks for the minimum possible distance of Q to P (via S) over all
choices of S ∈Me(P).
4.4 Eisenberg-Noe model
The previous three examples provide general rules for aggregating the wealths of the institutions.
As these rules ignore the precise structure of the financial system, they would be useful in systemic
risk measurement, for instance, in the absence of detailed information about interbank liabilities.
In this subsection, we consider the network model of Eisenberg, Noe (2001), where the financial
institutions (typically banks) are modeled as the nodes of a network and the liabilities between
the institutitons are represented on the arcs. As in Feinstein et al. (2017), we will add society as
an additional node to the network and define the aggregation function as the net equity of society
after clearing payments are realized based on the liabilities.
Let us recall the description of the model. We consider a financial network with nodes 0, 1, . . . , d,
where nodes 1, . . . , d denote the institutions and node 0 denotes society. For an arc (i, j) with
i, j ∈ {0, 1 . . . , d}, let us denote by `ij ≥ 0 the nominal liability of node i to node j. We make the
following assumptions.
(i) Society has no liabilities, that is, `0i = 0 for every i ∈ {1, . . . , d}.
(ii) Every institution has nonzero liability to society, that is, `i0 > 0 for every i ∈ {1, . . . , d}.
(iii) Self-liabilities are ignored, that is, `ii = 0 for every i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , d}.
For an arc (i, j) with i 6= 0, the corresponding relative liability is defined as
aij :=
`ij
p¯i
,
where p¯i :=
∑d
j=0 `ij > 0 is the total liability of institution i.
Given a realized state x ∈ Rd, a vector p(x) := (p1(x), . . . , pd(x))T ∈ Rd+ is called a clearing
payment vector for the system if it solves the fixed point problem
pi(x) = min
p¯i, xi +
d∑
j=1
ajipj(x)
 , i ∈ {1, . . . , d} .
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In this case, the payment pi(x) of an institution i at clearing must be equal either to the total
liability of i (no default) or else to the total income of i coming from other institutions as well as
its realized wealth (default). Clearly, every clearing payment vector p = p(x) is a feasible solution
of the linear programming problem
maximize
d∑
i=1
ai0pi (P (x))
subject to pi ≤ xi +
d∑
j=1
ajipj , i ∈ {1, . . . , d} ,
pi ∈ [0, p¯i], i ∈ {1, . . . , d} .
Let us denote by Λ(x) the optimal value of problem (P (x)). Note that this problem is either
infeasible, in which case we set Λ(x) = −∞, or else it has a finite optimal value Λ(x) ∈ [0, p¯], where
p¯ :=
∑d
i=0 ai0p¯i. Let us denote by X the set of all x ∈ Rd for which (P (x)) is feasible. Clearly,
Rd+ ⊆ X . In fact, only the case x ∈ Rd+ is considered by Eisenberg, Noe (2001) and it is shown
in Eisenberg, Noe (2001, Lemma 4) that every optimal solution of (P (x)) is a clearing payment
vector for the system. We note here that the same result holds for every x ∈ X since the objective
function is strictly increasing with respect to the payment pi of each institution i.
Therefore, if x ∈ X , then the optimal value Λ(x) is the equity of society after clearing payments
are realized, and if x /∈ X , then we have Λ(x) = −∞ in which case there is no clearing payment
vector. Hence, we set Λ to be the aggregation function for the Eisenberg-Noe model as it quantifies
the impact of the financial network on society.
It is easy to check that Λ is increasing, concave and non-constant. Hence, it satisfies the
definition of an aggregation function except that it may take the value −∞. Nevertheless, by
Remark 4.2 below, we are able to apply Theorem 3.2 to this choice of Λ. In Proposition 4.1 below,
we provide a simple expression for the conjugate function g defined by (3.1).
Proposition 4.1. For z ∈ Rd+, one has
g(z) =
d∑
i=1
ci(z)
+,
where
ci(z) =
d∑
j=0
`ij(zj − zi),
and z0 := 1. Consequently, for every Q ∈Md(P), S ∈Me(P), w ∈ Rd+\{0},
ES
[
g
(
w · dQ
dS
)]
=
d∑
i=1
ES
[
ci
(
w · dQ
dS
)+]
=
d∑
i=1
ES
 d∑
j=0
`ij
(
wj
dQj
dS
− widQi
dS
)+ ,
where w0 := 1,Q0 := S.
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Proof. Let z ∈ Rd+. We have
g(z) = sup
x∈Rd
(
Λ(x)− zTx
)
= sup
pi∈[0,p¯i], i∈{1,...,d}

d∑
i=1
ai0pi − inf
x∈Rd
zTx | xi ≥ pi −
d∑
j=1
ajipj , i ∈ {1, . . . , d}


= sup
pi∈[0,p¯i], i∈{1,...,d}

d∑
i=1
ai0pi −
d∑
i=1
zi
pi − d∑
j=1
ajipj

= sup
pi∈[0,p¯i], i∈{1,...,d}
d∑
i=1
ai0 + d∑
j=1
aijzj − zi
 pi
=
d∑
i=1
ci(z)
+
since
ci(z) =
d∑
j=0
`ij (zj − zi) = p¯i
ai0 + d∑
j=1
aijzj − zi
 .
Hence, the last statement follows.
Therefore, for the multivariate g-divergence of the Eisenberg-Noe model, the contribution of in-
stitution i is computed as follows. The difference between the weighted density wj
dQj
dS of institution
j and the weighted density wi
dQi
dS of institution i is computed and this difference is multiplied by
the corresponding liability `ij ≥ 0. The positive part of the sum of these (weighted) differences over
all j 6= i is the (random) measurement of the incompatibility of Qi, wi for institution i given the
choices of Qj , wj for institutions j 6= i as well as the choice of S for society. Finally, the expected
value of this measurement gives the contribution of institution i to the g-divergence.
Remark 4.2. Note that the aggregation function Λ in this example takes the value −∞ on Rd\X ,
which is not allowed in the general framework of Section 2. In particular, Λ(X) ∈ L∞ may no
longer hold true. Nevertheless, Definition 2.3 and Definition 2.5 of the systemic risk measures still
make sense with the usual acceptance set A ⊆ L∞ of a monetary risk measure ρ : L∞ → R. One
just obtains Rins(X) = ∅ if Λ(X) /∈ L∞. Equivalently, one can extend ρ to random variables of the
form Z˜ = Z1F −∞1Ω\F with Z ∈ L∞ and F ∈ F (1F denotes the stochastic indicator function of
F ) by
ρ(Z˜) =
{
ρ(Z) if P(F ) = 1,
+∞ if P(F ) < 1,
and then define Rins and Rsen by (2.1) and (2.2). Naturally, this extended definition yields ρins(X) =
ρ(Λ(X)) = +∞ and Rins(X) = ∅ if P {Λ(X) ∈ R} < 1. In other words, the insensitive systemic risk
measure provides no capital allocation vectors in this case. However, with the sensitive systemic
risk measure Rsen, it is always possible to find a nonempty set of capital allocation vectors. Indeed,
it is easy to check that, for every X ∈ L∞d , the vector z¯ ∈ Rd defined by zi =
∥∥X−i ∥∥∞ for each
i ∈ {1, . . . , d} yields Λ(X + z¯) ∈ L∞ (as X + z¯ ≥ 0), and moreover, one can find z ∈ Rd with
Λ(X + z¯ + z) ∈ A so that z¯ + z ∈ Rsen(X). Finally, with the extended definition, Rsen still has the
dual representation in Theorem 3.2 with minor and obvious changes in the proof in Section 7.2 and
the dual representation of Rins in Theorem 3.2 holds for X with Λ(X) ∈ L∞, else Rins(X) = ∅.
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4.5 Eisenberg-Noe model with central clearing
When a central clearing counterparty (CCP) is introduced to the financial system, all liabilities
between the institutions are realized through the CCP, which results in a star-shaped structure in
the modified network. On the other hand, the institutions still have their liabilities to society. In
this subsection, we consider the modified Eisenberg-Noe model with the CCP and society and show
that the g-divergence in this model can be written in a similar way as in the model without the
CCP.
Let us consider again the Eisenberg-Noe model without the CCP where the liabilities `ij , i, j ∈
{0, 1, . . . , d}, satisfy the three assumptions of the previous subsection. We add the CCP to the
network as node d+ 1 and compute the liabilities between the CCP and institution i ∈ {1, . . . , d}
by
`i(d+1) :=
 d∑
j=1
`ij −
d∑
j=1
`ji
+ , `(d+1)i :=
 d∑
j=1
`ij −
d∑
j=1
`ji
− .
In other words, if the net interbank liability of institution i is positive in the original network, then
this amount is set as the liability of institution i to the CCP; otherwise, the absolute value of this
amount is set as liability of the CCP to institution i. Once the liabilities of/to the CCP are set,
the liabilities on the arcs (i, j) with i, j ∈ {1, . . . , d} are all set to zero but the liability `i0 > 0 of
institution i to society remains the same.
In the modified network, a given realized state x has d+1 components, that is, x = (x1, . . . , xd+1)
T,
and the defining fixed point problem of a clearing payment vector p(x) = (p1(x), . . . , pd+1(x))
T ∈
Rd+1+ can be written as
pi(x) = min
{
`i(d+1) + `i0, xi + pd+1(x)
`(d+1)i∑d
j=1 `(d+1)j
}
, i ∈ {1, . . . , d} , (4.1)
pd+1(x) = min
{
d∑
i=1
`(d+1)i, xd+1 +
d∑
i=1
pi(x)
`i(d+1)
`i(d+1) + `i0
}
. (4.2)
The corresponding linear programming problem becomes
maximize
d∑
i=1
`i0
`i0 + `i(d+1)
pi (P˜ (x))
subject to pi ≤ xi +
`(d+1)i∑d
j=1 `(d+1)j
pd+1, i ∈ {1, . . . , d} ,
pd+1 ≤ xd+1 +
d∑
i=1
`i(d+1)
`i(d+1) + `i0
pi,
pi ∈ [0, `i(d+1) + `i0], i ∈ {1, . . . , d} ,
pd+1 ∈
[
0,
d∑
i=1
`(d+1)i
]
.
Let us denote by Λ˜(x) the optimal value of problem (P˜ (x)) and by X˜ the set of all x ∈ Rd+1 for
which (P˜ (x)) is feasible. As in the original network, if x /∈ X˜ , then we have Λ˜(x) = −∞ and there
exists no clearing payment vectors. On the other hand, if x ∈ X˜ , then (P˜ (x)) has a finite optimal
value Λ˜(x). However, as the objective function does not depend on the payment pd+1 of the CCP,
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an optimal solution of (P˜ (x)) may fail to be a clearing payment vector. In particular, Eisenberg,
Noe (2001, Lemma 4) does not apply here. Nevertheless, any clearing payment vector is a solution
of (P˜ (x)), and we will show in Proposition 4.3 that, for feasible (P˜ (x)), one can always find an
optimal solution that is also a clearing payment vector.
Proposition 4.3. Suppose x ∈ X˜ . Then (P˜ (x)) has an optimal solution p(x) ∈ Rd+1+ that is also a
clearing payment vector. Moreover, the optimal value Λ˜(x) equals the equity of society after clearing
payments are realized under any such solution of (P˜ (x)).
Proof. Let p ∈ Rd+1+ be an optimal solution of (P˜ (x)), which exists as (P˜ (x)) is a feasible bounded
linear programming problem by supposition. Let us define p(x) ∈ Rd+1+ by
pi(x) := pi, i ∈ {1, . . . , d} ,
pd+1(x) := xd+1 +
d∑
i=1
`i(d+1)
`i(d+1) + `i0
pi.
Note that pd+1(x) ≥ pd+1 ≥ 0. On the other hand, p(x) satisfies the first part of the fixed point
problem, namely, the system of equations in (4.1). This is due to the fact that the objective function
has a strictly positive coefficient for pi(x) for each i ∈ {1, . . . , d} and the conclusion can be checked
in the same way as in the proof of Eisenberg, Noe (2001, Lemma 4). Hence, it is clear from (4.1),
(4.2) that p(x) is a clearing payment vector. Therefore, p(x) is also a feasible solution of (P˜ (x)).
Finally, the objective function values of p(x) and p coincide. Therefore, p(x) is an optimal solution
of (P˜ (x)). The second statement follows from the optimality of p(x).
With Proposition 4.3, the computations of the conjugate function g˜ and the corresponding
multivariate g˜-divergence function can be seen as a special case of the computations in the original
model in Section 4.4.
Corollary 4.4. For every z ∈ Rd+1+ ,
g˜(z) =
d∑
i=1
[
`i0(1− zi) + `i(d+1)(zd+1 − zi)
]+
+
(
d∑
i=1
`(d+1)i(zi − zd+1)
)+
.
Consequently, for every Q ∈Md+1(P), S ∈Me(S), w ∈ Rd+1+ \{0},
ES
[
g˜
(
w · dQ
dS
)]
=
d∑
i=1
E
[
`i0
(
1− widQi
dS
)
+ `i(d+1)
(
wd+1
Qd+1
dS
− widQi
dS
)]+
+ E
[
d∑
i=1
`(d+1)i
(
wi
dQi
dS
− wd+1dQd+1
dS
)]+
Proof. This is a special case of Proposition 4.1 for a network with d+ 1 nodes and society.
4.6 Resource allocation model
The resource allocation problem is a classical operations research problem where the aim is to
allocate d limited resources for m different tasks so as to maximize the profit made from these
tasks. In the systemic risk context, this problem is discussed in Chen et al. (2013) as well.
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To be precise, let us fix the problem data p ∈ Rm+ , A ∈ Rd×m+ where pj denotes the unit
profit made from task j and Aij denotes the utilization rate of resource i by task j, for each
i ∈ {1, . . . , d} , j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. We also denote by u ∈ Rm an allocation vector where uj quantifies
the production in task j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. In addition, the realized state of the system is a vector
x ∈ Rd where xi denotes the capacity of resource i ∈ {1, . . . , d}. Then, the aggregation function is
defined as the profit made from allocating the capacities optimally for the tasks, namely, Λ(x) is
the optimal value of the following linear programming problem.
maximize pTu
subject to Au ≤ x,
u ≥ 0.
As in Remark 4.2 of the Eisenberg-Noe model, it can be argued that the infeasible case Λ(x) = −∞
creates no problems for the application of the general duality result Theorem 3.2. The following
proposition provides the special form of the multivariate g-divergence and the systemic penalty
function.
Proposition 4.5. For every z ∈ Rd+,
g(z) =
{
0 if ATz ≥ p,
+∞ else.
Consequently, for every Q ∈Md(P),S ∈Me(P), w ∈ Rd+\{0},
ES
[
g
(
w · dQ
dS
)]
=
{
0 if AT
(
w · dQdS
)
≥ p,
+∞ else,
and
αsys(Q, w) = inf
{
α(S) | AT
(
w · dQ
dS
)
≥ p, S ∈Me(P)
}
.
Proof. Note that
g(z) = sup
x∈Rd
(
Λ(x)− zTx
)
= sup
u∈Rm+
(
pTu− inf
{x∈Rd|x≥Au}
zTx
)
= sup
u∈Rm+
(
pTu− zTAu
)
= sup
u∈Rm+
(p−ATz)Tu,
which is the value of the support function of the cone Rm+ in the direction p−ATz. Hence,
g(z) =
{
0 if ATz − p ∈ Rm+ ,
+∞ else,
which proves the first claim. The rest follows directly from the definitions of the multivariate
g-divergence and the systemic penalty function.
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In light of Proposition 4.5, let us comment on the interpretation of the dual variables. To each
resource i, we assign a probability measure Qi and a weight wi. In addition, we assign a probability
measure S to the economy. Then, the weighted density wi dQidS can be seen as the unit profit made
from using resource i. Given S, we say that the choices of Q, w are compatible with S if, for each
j, the total profit made out of a unit activity in task j exceeds the original unit profit for task j
(with probability one), that is, if
d∑
i=1
Aijwi
dQi
dS
≥ pj .
4.7 Network flow model
The maximum flow problem aims to maximize the total flow from a source node to a sink node
in a capacitated network (Harris, Ross, 1955; Schrijver, 2002). In the systemic risk context, this
problem is discussed in Chen et al. (2013) as well.
Let us formally recall the problem. We consider a network (N , E), where N is the set of nodes
and E ⊆ N × N is the nonempty set of arcs with d := |E|. On this network, each arc (a, b) has
some capacity x(a,b) ∈ R for carrying flow. Then, x = (x(a,b))(a,b)∈E ∈ Rd is a realized state of this
system. We are interested in maximizing the flow from a fixed source node s ∈ N to a fixed sink
node t ∈ N \{s}.
In this example, we will consider the so-called path formulation of the maximum flow problem
as a linear programming problem. To that end, let us recall that a (simple) path p is a finite
sequence of arcs where no node is visited more than once. Let P be the set of all paths starting
from s and ending at t, and let m := |P |. For each p ∈ P , we will denote by up ∈ R a flow carried
over path p. Then, the aggregation function is defined as the maximum total flow carried over the
paths in P , that is, Λ(x) is the optimal value of the following linear programming problem.
maximize
∑
p∈P
up
subject to
∑
{p∈P |(a,b)∈p}
up ≤ x(a,b), (a, b) ∈ E .
As in Remark 4.2, it can be argued that the infeasible case Λ(x) = −∞ creates no problems for
the application of the general duality results. The following proposition provides the special form
of the multivariate g-divergence and the systemic penalty function.
Proposition 4.6. For every z = (z(a,b))(a,b)∈E ∈ Rd+,
g(z) =
{
0 if
∑
(a,b)∈p z(a,b) = 1 for every p ∈ P,
+∞ else.
Consequently, for every Q = (Q(a,b))(a,b)∈E ∈Md(P), S ∈Me(P), w = (w(a,b))(a,b)∈E ∈ Rd+\{0},
ES
[
g
(
w · dQ
dS
)]
=
{
0 if
∑
(a,b)∈pw(a,b)
dQ(a,b)
dS = 1 for every p ∈ P,
+∞ else,
and
αsys(Q, w) = inf
S∈Me(P)
α(S) | ∑
(a,b)∈p
w(a,b)
dQ(a,b)
dS
= 1 for every p ∈ P
 .
21
Proof. Let z ∈ Rd+. We have
g(z) = sup
x∈Rd
(
Λ(x)− zTx
)
= sup
u∈Rm
∑
p∈P
up − inf
x∈Rd
zTx | ∑{p∈P |(a,b)∈p}up ≤ x(a,b) for every (a, b) ∈ E


= sup
u∈Rm
∑
p∈P
1− ∑
(a,b)∈p
z(a,b)
up
=
{
0 if
∑
(a,b)∈p z(a,b) = 1 for every p ∈ P,
+∞ else.
The rest follows directly from the definitions of the multivariate g-divergence and the systemic
penalty function.
Note that the sensitive systemic risk measure Rsen provides a quantification of the risk resulting
from a random shock X = (X(a,b))(a,b)∈E that affects the capacities of the arcs. In light of Proposi-
tion 4.6, we assign a probability measure Q(a,b) and a weight w(a,b) to each arc (a, b). In addition,
we assign a probability measure S to the (possibly hypothetical) arc (s, t), which provides a direct
connection from the source to the sink. We also assume that the weight of this arc is w(s,t) = 1.
Then, the weighted density w(a,b)
dQ(a,b)
dS can be seen as the unit cost of carrying a unit flow on arc
(a, b) and the unit cost of carrying a unit flow on arc (s, t) is 1. Therefore, given S, we say that the
choices of Q, w are compatible with S if, for each path p ∈ P , the total cost of carrying a unit flow
along p coincides with the cost of carrying a unit flow directly from the source to the sink (with
probability one), that is, if ∑
(a,b)∈p
w(a,b)
dQ(a,b)
dS
= 1 = w(a,b)
dS
dS
.
5 Connection to computations of systemic risk measures
The model-specific dual representations developed in Section 4 may be useful in the computation
of the sensitive systemic risk measure Rsen. While the focus of the present paper is not on compu-
tational issues, we would like to illustrate the link between dual representations and computations
on a few examples.
Let us fix X ∈ L∞d . The set Rsen(X) can be regarded in relation to the convex vector optimiza-
tion problem
minimize z with respect to Rd+ subject to Λ(X + z) ∈ A
whose so-called weakly minimal points correspond to the boundary points of Rsen(X). We refer the
reader to Lo¨hne (2011, Chapter 2) for the basic notions of vector optimization. Many algorithms for
convex vector optimization, such as the dual Benson-type algorithm in Lo¨hne et al. (2014), iterate
by updating a weight vector w ∈ Rd+ and solving the corresponding weighted sum scalarization
problem, that is, the problem of calculating the scalarization ρsenw (X). Hence, for a successful
implementation of such an algorithm for the computation of Rsen(X), one needs to propose a
method to calculate the scalazations.
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For simplicity and illustration, let us assume that ρ(Y ) = E [−Y ] for every Y ∈ L∞. Let us
fix Q ∈ Md(P) and w ∈ Rd+\{0}. In the setting of the Eisenberg-Noe model, by Remark 3.3 and
Proposition 4.1, we have
αsys(Q, w) = EP
[
g
(
w · dQ
dP
)]
=
d∑
i=1
EP
 d∑
j=0
`ij
(
wj
dQj
dP
− widQi
dP
)+ .
In addition, it is easy to check that we also have α˜sys(Q, w) = αsys(Q, w) in this case. Hence, by
Corollary 3.4,
ρsenw (X) = sup
Q∈Md(P)
wTEQ [−X]− d∑
i=1
EP
 d∑
j=0
`ij
(
wj
dQj
dP
− widQi
dP
)+
= sup
Q∈Md(P)
d∑
i=1
EP
−widQi
dP
Xi −
 d∑
j=0
`ij
(
wj
dQj
dP
− widQi
dP
)+ . (5.1)
When Ω is a finite probability space, following some standard manipulations for the positive part
function, the last maximization problem can be converted into a finite-dimensional linear pro-
gramming problem and solved numerically with standard optimization solvers. A similar linear
programming problem can be derived for the version of the model with central clearing as well
(Section 4.5).
For the resource allocation model in Section 4.6, a simpler objective function can be obtained
since the multivariate divergence function in Proposition 4.5 is an indicator function. It can be
checked that (5.1) for this model becomes
ρsenw (X) = sup
Q∈Md(P)
 ∑
(a,b)∈p
EP
[
−w(a,b)
dQ(a,b)
dP
X(a,b)
]
| c ≥ 0,
∑
(a,b)∈p
w(a,b)
dQ(a,b)
dP
= c ∀p ∈ P
 ,
which is a linear programming problem and can be solved numerically when Ω is finite. A similar
calculation can be carried out for the network flow model in Section 4.7.
The actual computational experiments regarding this connection are beyond the scope of this
paper.
6 Model uncertainty interpretation
We finish the main part of the paper by pointing out an observation that bridges the sensitive
systemic risk measure Rsen with the so-called multivariate utility-based shortfall risk measures of
recent interest in the literature.
6.1 Multivariate shortfall risk measure
As the aggregation function Λ: Rd → R is assumed to be increasing and concave, it can be seen
as a multivariate utility function. Motivated by its univariate counterpart introduced in Fo¨llmer,
Schied (2002), a multivariate shortfall risk measures with respect to Λ can be defined as follows.
Definition 6.1. Let λ0 ∈ − int Λ(Rd). The set-valued function R(·;P, λ0) : L∞d → 2R
d
defined by
R(X;P, λ0) =
{
z ∈ Rd | E [−Λ(X + z)] ≤ λ0
}
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for X ∈ L∞d is called the shortfall risk measure with threshold level λ0 and model P.
The financial interpretation of the shortfall risk measure is that, for a multivariate financial
position X, it collects the set of all deterministic porfolios z ∈ Rd for which the expected loss of
X + z does not exceed the fixed threshold level λ0. (The use of P in the notation R(X;P, λ0) will
become clear when this risk measure is considered under model uncertainty in Section 6.2 below.)
Such risk measures based on multivariate utility functions have been studied recently in Ararat
et al. (2017); Armenti et al. (2015).
The shortfall risk measure R(·;P, λ0) defined above is an example of a sensitive systemic risk
measure where the risk measure for aggregate values is chosen to be a shifted expectation, namely,
ρ(Y ) = E [−Y ]− λ0 (6.1)
for every Y ∈ L∞. A direct application of Theorem 3.2 yields the following dual representation.
As this representation suggests when compared to Theorem 3.2, using R(·;P, λ0) as a systemic risk
measure amounts to assuming that the probability measure (the model) for society is known with
certainty and is equal to P.
Proposition 6.2. In the setting of Definition 6.1, it holds
R(X;P, λ0) =
⋂
Q∈Md(P),w∈Rd+\{0}
{
z ∈ Rd | wTz ≥ wTEQ [−X]− λ0 − E
[
g
(
w · dQ
dP
)]}
for every X ∈ L∞d .
Proof. This is immediate from Theorem 3.2 once we realize that the penalty function of the risk
measure defined in (6.1) is given by
α(S) =
{
λ0 if S = P,
+∞ else,
for S ∈M(P).
Example 6.3. Consider the Eisenberg-Noe model without central clearing as in Section 4.4. In
this case, the shortfall risk measure R(·;P.λ0) takes the form
R(X;P, λ0)
=
z ∈ Rd | E
sup

d∑
i=1
ai0pi | pi ≤ Xi + zi +
d∑
j=1
ajipj , pi ∈ [0, p¯i], i ∈ {1, . . . , d}

 ≥ −λ0

=
⋂
Q∈Md(P),w∈Rd+\{0}
z ∈ Rd | wTz ≥ wTEQ [−X]−λ0−
d∑
i=1
E
 d∑
j=0
`ij
(
wj
dQj
dP
−widQi
dP
)+
for X ∈ L∞d , by Proposition 4.1 and Proposition 6.2.
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6.2 A model uncertainty representation
The connection between shortfall risk measures and the sensitive systemic risk measure Rsen can
be exploited further by rearranging the order of intersections/suprema in the dual representation
given by Theorem 3.2. In what follows, we show that any sensitive systemic risk measure Rsen (i.e.
for an arbitrary choice of ρ) can be seen as a shortfall risk measure under model uncertainty.
Proposition 6.4. Suppose that Λ(Rd) = R. It holds
Rsen(X) =
⋂
{S∈Me(P) | α(S)∈R}
R(X; S, α(S)) =
⋂
{S∈Me(P) | α(S)∈R}
{
z ∈ Rd | ES [−Λ(X + z)] ≤ α(S)
}
for every X ∈ L∞d .
In other words, regardless of the choice of ρ, the sensitive systemic risk measure can always be
seen as a shortfall risk measure subject to an uncertainty in the probability measure S of society.
To measure systemic risk, one makes a conservative computation (intersection) of the shortfall risk
over all sensible choices of S. Moreover, in each of the shortfall risk measure R(·; S, α(S)), the
penalty α(S) for choosing S serves as a maximum allowable expected loss under S.
Proof of Proposition 6.4. For fixed X ∈ L∞d , we have
Rsen(X) =
⋂
Q∈Md(P),w∈Rd+\{0}
{
z ∈ Rd | wTz ≥ wTEQ [−X]− αsys(Q, w)
}
=
⋂
S∈Me(P)
⋂
Q∈Md(P),w∈Rd+\{0}
{
z ∈ Rd | wTz ≥ wTEQ [−X]− α(S)− ES
[
g
(
w · dQ
dS
)]}
=
⋂
S∈Me(P)
⋂
Q∈Md(S),w∈Rd+\{0}
{
z ∈ Rd | wTz ≥ wTEQ [−X]− α(S)− ES
[
g
(
w · dQ
dS
)]}
=
⋂
{S∈Me(P) | α(S)∈−Λ(Rd)}
R(X;S, α(S)).
The following arguments make the above computation valid. The first two equalities are by The-
orem 3.2. The third equality follows from the basic observation that Md(P) = Md(S) for every
S ∈ Me(P). The fourth equality follows since the inner intersection in the penultimate line is the
dual representation of the shortfall risk measure with threshold level α(S) ∈ R and model S; see
Proposition 6.2. Here, we need to exclude the cases where S ∈Me(P) is such that α(S) = +∞. In
such cases, the inner intersection in the penultimate line simply gives Rd, which does not change
the outer intersection in the same line. Hence, the result follows.
7 Proofs
7.1 Proofs of the results in Section 2
Proof of Proposition 2.8.
1. Let X,Z ∈ L∞d . To show monotonicity, suppose that X ≥ Z. Since Λ is increasing and ρ is
monotone, it holds ρ(Λ(X)) ≤ ρ(Λ(Z)). By (2.1), it follows that Rins(X) ⊇ Rins(Z). To show
25
convexity, let x ∈ Rins(X), z ∈ Rins(Z) and γ ∈ [0, 1]. By (2.1), it holds ρ(Λ(X)) ≤∑di=1 xi
and ρ(Λ(Z)) ≤∑di=1 zi. Then,
ρ(Λ(γX + (1− γ)Z)) ≤ ρ (γΛ(X) + (1− γ)Λ(Z))
≤ γρ(Λ(X)) + (1− γ)ρ(Λ(Z))
≤
d∑
i=1
(γxi + (1− γ)zi) ,
where the first inequality follows by the concavity of Λ and the monotonicity of ρ, the second
inequality follows by the convexity of ρ, and the last inequality is by the supposition. There-
fore, γx+(1−γ)z ∈ Rins(γX+(1−γ)Z) and convexity follows. To show closedness, let z ∈ Rd.
As a result of the convexity of Rins, the set Lz :=
{
X ∈ L∞d | z ∈ Rins(X)
}
is convex. Hence,
by Fo¨llmer, Schied (2011, Lemma A.65), it suffices to show that Lr,z := {X ∈ Lz | ‖X‖∞ ≤ r}
is closed in L1d for every r > 0. (Here, ‖X‖∞ := ess sup |X| is the essential supremum norm on
L∞d with respect to some fixed norm |·| on Rd.) To that end, let z ∈ Rd, r > 0, and (Xn)n≥1
be a sequence in Lr,z converging to some X ∈ L1d in L1d. Then, there exists a subsequence
(Xnk)k≥1 converging to X almost surely. Since
|X| ≤ |Xnk −X|+ |Xnk | ≤ |Xnk −X|+ r
for every k ≥ 1, it follows that ‖X‖∞ ≤ r. On the other hand, (Λ(Xnk))k≥1 converges to
Λ(X) almost surely since Λ is a continuous function as a finite concave function on Rd. As
(Λ(Xnk))k≥1 is also a bounded sequence in L∞, by the Fatou property of ρ,
ρ(Λ(X)) ≤ lim inf
n→∞ ρ(Λ(X
nk)) ≤
d∑
i=1
zi.
so that z ∈ Rins(X). Hence, X ∈ Lr,z and closedness follows. Finiteness at zero is trivial
from (2.1) since ρ(Λ(X)) ∈ R.
2. Let X,Z ∈ L∞d . To show monotonicity, suppose that X ≥ Z. Since Λ is increasing and ρ is
monotone, it holds ρ(Λ(X + z)) ≤ ρ(Λ(Z + z)) for every z ∈ Rd. By (2.2), it follows that
Rsen(X) ⊇ Rsen(Z). To show convexity, let x ∈ Rsen(X), z ∈ Rsen(Z) and γ ∈ [0, 1]. By
(2.2), it holds ρ(Λ(X + x)) ≤ 0 and ρ(Λ(Z + z)) ≤ 0. Similar to the proof for the insensitive
case,
ρ(Λ(γX + (1− γ)Z + γx+ (1− γ)z)) ≤ γρ(Λ(X + x)) + (1− γ)ρ(Λ(Z + z)) ≤ 0.
Hence, γx+(1−γ)z ∈ Rsen(γX+(1−γ)Z) and convexity follows. To show closedness, similar
to the proof for the insensitive case, it suffices to show that the set {X ∈ L∞d | z ∈ Rsen(X),
‖X‖∞ ≤ r} is closed in L1d for arbitrarily fixed r > 0 and z ∈ Rd. Let (Xn)n≥1 be a sequence
in this set that converges to some X ∈ L1d in L1d. Using the Fatou property of ρ as above, it
can be checked that ρ(Λ(X+z)) ≤ lim infn→∞ ρ(Λ(Xnk+z)) ≤ 0 for a subsequence (Xnk)k≥1.
Hence, z ∈ Rsen(X) and closedness follows. To show finiteness at zero, note that
Rsen(0) =
{
z ∈ Rd | ρ(Λ(z)) ≤ 0
}
=
{
z ∈ Rd | ρ(0) ≤ Λ(z)
}
= Λ−1([ρ(0),+∞)),
where the first equality is by (2.2) and the second equality is by the translativity of ρ. Since
ρ(0) ∈ int Λ(Rd) by Assumption 2.1, it follows that Rsen(0) /∈ {∅,Rd}. Finally, translativity
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follows since
Rsen(X + z) =
{
x ∈ Rd | ρ(Λ(X + z + x)) ≤ 0
}
=
{
x ∈ Rd | ρ(Λ(X + x)) ≤ 0
}
− z
= Rsen(X)− z
for every z ∈ Rd.
Proof of Proposition 2.10. We have
Rins(γX) =
{
z ∈ Rd | ρ
(
Λ(γX) +
d∑
i=1
zi
)
≤ 0
}
=
{
z ∈ Rd | ρ
(
γΛ(X) +
d∑
i=1
zi
)
≤ 0
}
=
{
z ∈ Rd | γρ
(
Λ(X) +
d∑
i=1
zi
γ
)
≤ 0
}
=
{
z ∈ Rd | ρ
(
Λ(X) +
d∑
i=1
zi
γ
)
≤ 0
}
= γ
{
u ∈ Rd | ρ
(
Λ(X) +
d∑
i=1
ui
)
≤ 0
}
= γRins(X).
The proof for Rsen is similar.
7.2 Proof of Theorem 3.2
The proof of Theorem 3.2 relies on Lemma 7.1 below on the Fenchel conjugate of composed convex
functions.
To that end, let us recall a fundamental result in convex duality. For a function h : X →
R ∪ {+∞} on a locally convex topological linear space X , we define its epigraph as the set
epih := {(x, r) ∈ X × R | h(x) ≤ r} ,
and the conjugate function h∗ : X ∗ → R ∪ {+∞} on the topological dual space X ∗ by
h∗(x∗) := sup
x∈X
(〈x, x∗〉 − h(x))
for every x∗ ∈ X ∗, where 〈·, ·〉 is the natural bilinear mapping on X ∗ × X . According to the
Fenchel-Moreau biconjugation theorem (Zalinescu, 2002, Theorem 2.3.3), if h is a proper convex
lower semicontinuous function, then h = (h∗)∗.
Recall that L1d is the linear space of all integrable d-dimensional random vectors and L
∞
d is its
linear subspace of all essentially bounded elements (distinguished up to almost sure equality). Let
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us also define the cones Lpd,+ = {V ∈ Lp | P {V ≥ 0} = 1}, Lpd,++ = {V ∈ Lp | P {V > 0} = 1} for
p ∈ {1,+∞} and d ∈ N. If d = 1, then we write Lp = Lp1, Lp+ = Lp1,+, Lp++ = Lp1,++.
For λ > 0, consider the function fλ : L
1
d → R ∪ {+∞} defined by
fλ(U) := inf{V ∈−L1++|E[V ]=−λ}
(
−E
[
V g
(
U
V
)]
+ λρ∗
(
V
λ
))
(7.1)
for U ∈ L1d.
Lemma 7.1. Let λ > 0. The function (λρ ◦ Λ)∗ is the closure of fλ, that is, epi (λρ ◦ Λ)∗ = cl epi fλ.
In particular,
sup
U∈C
(
E
[
UTX
]
− (λρ ◦ Λ)∗ (U)
)
= sup
U∈C
(
E
[
UTX
]
− fλ(U)
)
,
for every closed convex set C ⊆ L1d and X ∈ L∞d .
Proof. The proof is based on a general conjugation theorem for the composition of an increasing
convex function with a convex function, see Bot¸ et al. (2009, Theorem 3.1). To that end, let us
consider Λ as a function on L∞d with values in L
∞, which is a convex function when L∞ is partially
ordered by the cone −L∞+ : Λ(γZ1 + (1− γ)Z2) ∈ γΛ(Z1) + (1− γ)Λ(Z2)−L∞+ every Z1, Z2 ∈ L∞d ,
γ ∈ [0, 1]. Similarly, ρ is increasing with respect to this partial order on L∞: Y 1 ∈ Y 2−L∞+ implies
ρ(Y 1) ≥ ρ(Y 2) for every Y 1, Y 2 ∈ L∞. Let us define hV (Z) = E [V Λ(Z)] for every V ∈ L1 and
Z ∈ L∞d . By Bot¸ et al. (2009, Theorem 3.1), using Assumption 2.1, (λρ ◦ Λ)∗ is the closure of the
function f¯λ defined by
f¯λ(U) = inf
V ∈−L1+
(h∗V (U) + (λρ)
∗(V ))
for every U ∈ L1d. Let us fix U ∈ L1d and V ∈ −L1+. We have
h∗V (U) = sup
X∈L∞d
(
E
[
UTX
]
− E [V Λ(X)]
)
= sup
X∈L∞d
E
[
UTX − V Λ(X)
]
= E
[
sup
x∈Rd
(
UTx− V Λ(x)
)]
,
where the last line follows by the general rule for the optimization of integral functionals; see
Rockafellar, Wets (2010, Theorem 14.60). From the last line, it is clear that h∗V (U) = +∞ if
P {V = 0} > 0. Suppose that V ∈ −L1++. Then,
h∗V (U) = −E
[
V g
(
U
V
)]
since g is the conjugate of the function x 7→ −Λ(−x) on Rd. On the other hand,
(λρ)∗(V ) = λρ∗
(
V
λ
)
for λ > 0. Using the monotonicity and translativity of ρ, it can be checked that ρ∗
(
V
λ
)
< +∞
implies E [V ] = −λ; see Fo¨llmer, Schied (2011, Remark 4.18), for instance. Hence,
f¯λ(U) = inf{V ∈−L1++|E[V ]=−λ}
(
−E
[
V g
(
U
V
)]
+ λρ∗
(
V
λ
))
,
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that is, f¯λ coincides with the function fλ defined in (7.1). Finally, the last claim is a consequence
of the fact that a convex function and its closure have the same set of affine minorants and the
suprema of such minorants coincide when evaluated over the same closed convex set.
Proof of Theorem 3.2.
1. By the arguments in the proof of Proposition 2.8, it follows that ρ ◦Λ is a proper convex weak∗
lower semicontinuous function on L∞. It is also a decreasing function so that (ρ ◦ Λ)∗ (U) = +∞
for U /∈ −L1d,+. Let X ∈ L∞d . By the Fenchel-Moreau biconjugation theorem,
ρ (Λ(X)) = sup
U∈−L1d,+
(
E
[
UTX
]
− (ρ ◦ Λ)∗ (U)
)
. (7.2)
Moreover, we can indeed exclude U = 0 in this computation and write
ρ (Λ(X)) = sup
U∈−L1d,+\{0}
(
E
[
UTX
]
− (ρ ◦ Λ)∗ (U)
)
. (7.3)
To see this, we first claim that there exists U¯ ∈ −L1d,+ \{0} with (ρ ◦ Λ)∗ (U¯) ∈ R. Suppose
otherwise. Since (ρ◦Λ)∗ is a proper function as the conjugate of a proper function, we must have
(ρ ◦ Λ)∗ (U¯) < +∞ if and only if U¯ = 0. By (7.2), this would imply ρ(Λ(X)) = − (ρ ◦ Λ)∗ (0) =
infZ∈L∞d ρ(Λ(Z)) for every X ∈ L∞d so that ρ ◦ Λ is a constant function. This is a contradiction
to the assumption that Λ is non-constant; see Section 2. Hence, the claim holds. Let us define
Un := 1n U¯ ∈ −L1d,+\{0} for each n ∈ N so that (Un)n∈N converges to 0 in L1d. Using the concavity
of the function U 7→ f(U) := E [UTX]− (ρ ◦ Λ)∗ (U), it holds
sup
U∈−L1d,+\{0}
f(U) ≥ f(Un) ≥ 1
n
f(U¯) +
(
1− 1
n
)
f(0) (7.4)
for every n ∈ N. Since −∞ < f(U¯) ≤ ρ (Λ(X)) < +∞ by (7.2) and the finite-valuedness of ρ,
we obtain
sup
U∈−L1d,+\{0}
f(U) ≥ f(0)
by passing to the limit in (7.4) as n→∞, so that (7.3) holds.
Next, by Lemma 7.1 (with λ = 1),
ρ (Λ(X)) = sup
U∈−L1d,+\{0}
sup
{V ∈−L1++|E[V ]=−1}
(
E
[
UTX
]
+ E
[
V g
(
U
V
)]
− ρ∗(V )
)
.
for every X ∈ L∞d . Note that every U ∈ −L1d,+\{0} can be identified by a vector probability
measure Q ∈Md(P) and a weight vector w ∈ Rd+\{0} (and vice versa) by the relationship
wi = −E [Ui] , widQi
dP
= −Ui, i ∈ {1, . . . , d} .
(Note that Qi is defined arbitrarily when wi = 0.) Similarly, every V ∈ −L1++ with E [V ] = −1
can be identified by an equivalent measure S ∈Me(P) by setting
dS
dP
= −V. (7.5)
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In this case, ρ∗(V ) = α(S); see Fo¨llmer, Schied (2011, Remark 4.18), for instance. As a result
of these changes of variables,
ρ (Λ(X)) = sup
Q∈Md(P),w∈Rd+\{0}
sup
S∈Me(P)
(
wTEQ [−X]− ES
[
g
(
w · dQ
dS
)]
− α(S)
)
= sup
Q∈Md(P),w∈Rd+\{0}
(
wTEQ [−X]− inf
S∈Me(P)
(
ES
[
g
(
w · dQ
dS
)]
+ α(S)
))
= sup
Q∈Md(P),w∈Rd+\{0}
(
wTEQ [−X]− αsys(Q, w)
)
.
Finally, recalling (2.1), we obtain
Rins(X) =
{
z ∈ Rd | 1Tz ≥ ρ (Λ(X))
}
=
{
z ∈ Rd | 1Tz ≥ sup
Q∈Md(P),w∈Rd+\{0}
(
wTEQ [−X]− αsys(Q, w)
)}
=
⋂
Q∈Md(P),w∈Rd+\{0}
{
z ∈ Rd | 1Tz ≥ wTEQ [−X]− αsys(Q, w)
}
,
which finishes the proof of the dual representation for Rins.
2. Let us denote by ∆d−1 the standard simplex on Rd:
∆d−1 :=
{
u ∈ Rd+ |
d∑
i=1
ui = 1
}
.
As ∆d−1 is a base for the cone Rd+, a direct application of the separation theorem yields
Rsen(X) =
⋂
u∈∆d−1
{
z ∈ Rd | uTz ≥ ρsenu (X)
}
, (7.6)
where ρsenu : L
∞
d → R ∪ {−∞} is the scalarization of the set-valued risk measure Rsen in the
direction u ∈ ∆d−1, that is,
ρsenu (X) := inf
x∈Rsen(X)
uTx = inf
{x∈Rd|ρ(Λ(X+x))≤0}
uTx,
which is the optimal value of a convex minimization problem. By strong duality for convex
optimization, ρsenu (X) equals the value of the corresponding Lagrange dual problem:
ρsenu (X) = sup
λ>0
ρsenu,λ(X), (7.7)
where
ρsenu,λ(X) := inf
x∈Rd
(
uTx+ λρ (Λ(X + x))
)
.
In (7.7), the equality of the two sides is guaranteed by checking that the well-known Slater’s
constraint qualification holds: there exists x¯ ∈ Rd such that ρ (Λ(X + x¯)) < 0. Indeed, using
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Assumption 2.1, one can find x¯ ∈ Rd such that ρ(0) < Λ(−(‖X1‖∞ , . . . , ‖Xd‖∞)T + x¯), and
hence,
ρ (Λ(X + x¯)) ≤ ρ
(
Λ(−(‖X1‖∞ , . . . , ‖Xd‖∞)T + x¯)
)
= ρ(0)− Λ(−(‖X1‖∞ , . . . , ‖Xd‖∞)T + x¯) < 0.
(Here, ‖Xi‖∞ denotes the essential supremum of the absolute value of Xi for each i ∈ {1, . . . , d}.)
Using the properties of the set-valued risk measure Rsen in Proposition 2.8, it can be checked
that ρsenu,λ is a decreasing proper convex weak
∗ lower semicontinuous function. Let us compute
its Fenchel conjugate (ρsenu,λ)
∗ at U ∈ L1d:
(ρsenu,λ)
∗(U) := sup
X∈L∞d
(
E
[
UTX
]
− ρsenu,λ(X)
)
= sup
x∈Rd
sup
X∈L∞d
(
E
[
UTX
]
− uTx− λρ (Λ(X + x))
)
= sup
X∈L∞d
(
E
[
UTX
]
− λρ (Λ(X))
)
− inf
x∈Rd
(
(u+ E [U ])T x
)
.
Hence, (ρsenu,λ)
∗(U) = +∞ if E [U ] 6= −u. On the other hand, if E [U ] = −u, then
(ρsenu,λ)
∗(U) = sup
X∈L∞d
(
E
[
UTX
]
− λρ (Λ(X))
)
= (λρ ◦ Λ)∗ (U).
Hence, for every U ∈ L1d, we may write
(ρsenu,λ)
∗(U) = (λρ ◦ Λ)∗ (U) + I{E[·]+u=0}(U),
where I{E[·]+u=0}(U) is a convex indicator function which is equal to zero if E [U ] + u = 0 and
to +∞ otherwise.
Let us recall the definition of fλ in (7.1). By the variable transform (7.5) we obtain
fλ(U) = inf
S∈Me(P)
(
λES
[
g
(
− U
λ dSdP
)]
+ λα(S)
)
, (7.8)
for U ∈ L1d. By Lemma 7.1, (λρ ◦ Λ)∗ is the closure of fλ. Hence,
ρsenu,λ(X) = sup
U∈L1d
(
E
[
UTX
]
− fλ(U)− I{E[·]+u=0}(U)
)
= sup
{U∈L1d|E[U ]=−u}
(
E
[
UTX
]
− fλ(U)
)
.
Note that, as ρsenu,λ is a decreasing function, it holds (ρ
sen
u,λ)
∗(U) = +∞ if U /∈ −L1d,+. Hence,
ρsenu,λ(X) = sup{U∈−L1d,+|E[U ]=−u}
(
E
[
UTX
]
− fλ(U)
)
.
Note that every U ∈ −L1d,+ with E [U ] = −u can be identified by a vector probability measure
Q ∈Md(P) (and vice versa) by the relationship
ui
dQi
dP
= −Ui, i ∈ {1, . . . , d}
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so that
ρsenu,λ(X) = sup
Q∈Md(P)
(
uTEQ [−X]− fλ
(
−u · dQ
dP
))
.
By (7.8),
ρsenu,λ(X) = sup
Q∈Md(P)
sup
S∈Me(P)
(
uTEQ [−X]− λES
[
g
(
u · dQdP
λ dSdP
)]
− λα(S)
)
= sup
Q∈Md(P)
sup
S∈Me(P)
(
uTEQ [−X]− λES
[
g
(
u
λ
· dQ
dS
)]
− λα(S)
)
. (7.9)
Therefore (7.6), together with (7.7) and (7.9), yields
Rsen(X)
=
⋂
Q∈Md(P),S∈Me(P)
⋂
u∈∆d−1,λ>0
{
z ∈ Rd | uTz ≥ uTEQ [−X]− λES
[
g
(
u
λ
· dQ
dS
)]
− λα(S)
}
.
Note that every u ∈ ∆d−1 and λ > 0 can be characterized by some w ∈ Rd+\{0} (and vice versa)
via the relationship
wi =
ui
λ
, i ∈ {1, . . . , d} .
Hence,
Rsen(X)
=
⋂
Q∈Md(P),S∈Me(P)
⋂
w∈Rd+\{0}
{
z ∈ Rd | λwTz ≥ λwTEQ [−X]− λES
[
g
(
w · dQ
dS
)]
− λα(S)
}
=
⋂
Q∈Md(P),S∈Me(P)
⋂
w∈Rd+\{0}
{
z ∈ Rd | wTz ≥ wTEQ [−X]− ES
[
g
(
w · dQ
dS
)]
− α(S)
}
=
⋂
Q∈Md(P),w∈Rd+\{0}
{
z ∈ Rd | wTz ≥ wTEQ [−X]− inf
S∈Me(P)
(
ES
[
g
(
w · dQ
dS
)]
+ α(S)
)}
=
⋂
Q∈Md(P),w∈Rd+\{0}
{
z ∈ Rd | wTz ≥ wTEQ [−X]− αsys(Q, w)
}
=
⋂
Q∈Md(P),w∈Rd+\{0}
EQ [−X] +
{
z ∈ Rd | wTz ≥ −αsys(Q, w)
}
,
which finishes the proof of the dual representation for Rsen.
Proof of Corollary 3.4. The dual representation of ρins follows as a direct consequence of Theo-
rem 3.2 since Rins is a halfspace-valued function. To prove the dual representation of ρsenw for given
w ∈ Rd+\{0}, we first note that w may be uniquely written as w = au for some a > 0 and u ∈ ∆d−1.
Using (7.7) and (7.9), we already have
ρsenu (X) = sup
λ>0
ρsenu,λ(X) = sup
λ>0
sup
Q∈Md(P)
sup
S∈Me(P)
(
uTEQ [−X]− λES
[
g
(
u
λ
· dQ
dS
)]
− λα(S)
)
.
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Hence,
ρsenw (X) = inf
z∈Rsen(X)
wTz = aρsenu (X)
= sup
λ>0
sup
Q∈Md(P)
sup
S∈Me(P)
(
auTEQ [−X]− aλES
[
g
(
u
λ
· dQ
dS
)]
− aλα(S)
)
= sup
λ>0
sup
Q∈Md(P)
sup
S∈Me(P)
(
wTEQ [−X]− aλES
[
g
(
w
aλ
· dQ
dS
)]
− aλα(S)
)
= sup
λ>0
sup
Q∈Md(P)
sup
S∈Me(P)
(
wTEQ [−X]− λES
[
g
(
w
λ
· dQ
dS
)]
− λα(S)
)
= sup
λ>0
sup
Q∈Md(P)
(
wTEQ [−X]− λ inf
S∈Me(P)
(
ES
[
g
(
w
λ
· dQ
dS
)]
+ α(S)
))
= sup
λ>0
sup
Q∈Md(P)
(
wTEQ [−X]− λαsys(Q, w
λ
)
)
= sup
Q∈Md(P)
(
wTEQ [−X]− α˜sys(Q, w)
)
,
which is the desired result.
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